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I'l

THE sr;PRF.M:S COURT OF Tl-IE STATE OF UTAH

Tl-IE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

JOEY t1. WILLIAMS,
Case No.

17330

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE qATl'RE OF THE CASE
The appellant, JOEY M. \HLLIAI1S, appeals from a conviction
of Robbery in the

~hird

Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,

State of 1Ttah.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The appellant; JOEY M. WILLIAMS, was found guilty of
Robbery, a Second Degree Felony, by a jury.

The trial was

conducted September 4th, 8th. and 9th, 1980, with the Honorable
qorner F. Wilkinson, presiding.

Appellant was sentenced on

September 9, 1980, to serve an indeterminate term of not less than
one year nor more than fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a
new trial.
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STAT"SMEN'T' OF THE FACTS
The Holiday Oil Company service station at 3847 South
Redwood Road,

in Salt Lake County, was robbed during the evening

of November 24, 1979.

Mike Weaver

committed the crime pursuant

a plan designed by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department to
charge Weaver's accomplice, Joey Williams, with a criminal offens
This plan required Weaver to drive straight through a specified
intersection if the robbery had occurred as planned or to make a
turn at the intersection if the robbery had not taken place.
(T. 20, 100, 106).

In accordance with the plan, Weaver drove

straight through the intersection after the robbery occurred and
the vehicle was stopped by two sheriff's deputies.

(T.

28, 107).

Both occupants fled; Weaver was allowed to escape while Joey
Williams, the defendant, was apprehended. (T. 28, 108).
The robbery plan was devised after Weaver was appre~en~
for shoplifting at the ZCMI store in Cottonwood Mall.

Upon quest

in connection with the shoplifting charge Weaver said he would
cooperate with law enforcement officials with regard to a robbery
scheduled for that night.

(T. 52, 96).

Weaver was taken to the

Holiday Sheriff's substation where several members of the Sheriff
Department collaborated with Weaver to fonnulate a plan for the
robbery.

Weaver called Joey Williams while at the substation and

that conversation was recorded.

(T. 17, 97).

The transcript oft

tape was introduced into evidence at the trial.

(T. 101).

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

During both the prosecutor's opening remarks (T.7) and
the testimony of Mr. Weaver

(T.34~

reference was made to an allegedly

false statement secured from Mr. Weaver while he was in prison.
These assertions, made in the presence of the jury, either directly
or indirectly

implied that counsel for the defense was instrumental

in securing the perjorious statements.

(T. 7, 34).

The court

denied two motions for mistrial (T. 41, 118) based upon these
statements.

The defense

had given no indication that it intended

to use these statements from Weaver.
As a result of the attack on defense counsel by the prosectuion, counsel moved to withdraw from the case.

(T. 125).

Defense

counsel believed it would be necessary for him to testify about
how the statements from Weaver were obtained.

The court denied

defense counsel's motion even though his continued representation
of the defendant would be prejudicial to him because counsel's credibility had been attacked.

A further attempt to clarify the

relationship between Weaver and defense counsel was foreclosed when
the court required that the defense make a motion to call the
prosecutor as a material witness
motion.

(!.

(T. 130) and then denied the

131).

James Miller, an inmate at the Utah State Penitentiary,
was called as a witness for the defense to establish that Weaver
had cause to fear the members of the prison population.

(T. 220).

Miller acknowledged that he had been convicted of a felony and was
presentlv serving time in prison, however, the purpose of his
cestimony was to show that Weaver was generally disliked at the

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

prison.

The prosecutor, on cross examination.

inquired into the

nature and the details of Mr. Miller's past criminal activity.
(T. 222-223).

Defense counsel objected to this line of inquiry,

however the objection was overruled.

(T. 222-223).

During closing arguments the prosecutor improperly
invited the jurors to consider what might have happened had the
victim of the robbery been injured.
the court.

(Closing Argument, T.4)

This argument was allowed by
The prosecutor rebutted an

argument by defense counsel that Weaver had a motive to lie
pointing out that Weaver had a two year sentence to serve.

by
Less

t:

one month later, Weaver was granted parole after the prosecutor
personally appeared before the Board of Pardons and urged his ear:
parole.

(Board of Pardons, T. 5-7).

The prosecutor asserted that

Weaver's conduct during the trial had been so exemplary that he hi
decided to use his efforts to get Weaver out of prison.

(Board of

Pardons, T. 5-7).
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
MOTION FOR A MISTFIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTOR
INTRODUCED TESTIMOnY CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE STATE'S CHIEF WITNES.S BEFORE THE
DEFENSE BAD EVER SOUGBT TO IMPEACH THE WITNESS.
During his opening statement the prosecutor informed th<
jury that the defense possessed a statement made by Michael Weaver
that was inconsistent with what his trial testimony would be.

Dei

counsel objected to the reference because the alleged statement hi
not been introduced into evidence, nor had Michael Weaver's credSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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~l

ibility been attacked.

The appellant asserts that the court erred

in overruling his timely objection.
It is well settled that the purpose of an opening statement
in a jury trial is limited to a brief statement of the issues and
an outline of what counsel believes he can support with the
admissible evidence.
Th~

A.B.A. Standards, The Prosecution Function and

Defense Function, 119 (1971).

refer to particular evidence".

The opening statement may not
unless there is a good faith and

reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered
and admitted into evidence."

A.B.A. Standards, Prosecution and

Defense Function, §3-5.5 (2nd Ed. 1979).
In the present case the prosecutor, in his opening statement, referred to a statement that was allegedly in the possession
of

defense counsel.
The prosecutor told the jury that:
[Michael Weaver] was, at one point in time, coerced
into signing a statement which would indicate that
Mr. Williams was not involved in a crime.
Bear in
mind that he did that under duress and coercion at
the time because of the circumstances he was in.
He will testify to the fact that he did sign this
particular statement.
This statement at the present
time is in custody of the defense counsel. (T. 7)
The prosecutor had no power over the introduction of the

statement, and indeed, did not have any knowledge tnat the:statement
would be introduced into evidence.

Thus, his reference to the

statement was clearly improper.
-5-
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The Supreme

~curt

of Vermont recently held that the tri

court had erred by allowing the prosecution to make references to
prior consistent statements of the principal prosecution witness
its opening statement.

l.Joodmansee v. Stoneman, 344 A. 2d 26 ( 1 't.

In that case the defendant was charged with assisting someone to
avoid arrest and punishment for the crime of murder.

The princip

witness against the defendant had made several different statemen·
during the investigation of the case.
outlined in the prosecution's

These statements were

opening statement and were

during the prosecution's case.

admitt~

The prosecution argued that the

statements should be admitted to rehabilitate a witness who had
been impeached by a previous showing of "bias, interest or corrup
Id.at 30. The court stated:
The impeachment referred to, or the claim of recent
continuance, can hardly be said to have transpired
when the state made its opening argument.
[t)he
asserted purpose could not be a grounds for admissibility when [defense counsel] had not yet even been
heard, much less introduced evidence.
Id. at 30-31.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court faced a similar situation i
Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 33 N. W.

52,

(1887).

In that case the

court said:
In opening the case [the prosecutor) stated,
in effect, that the accused would introduce
testimony touching the character of the
complainant, and as to what he tried to prove
upon the former trial; but upon objection being
made, the court promptly ruled that he must
confine himself to stating to the jury the

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cause of the prosecution, but that he must not
state the cause of the accused to the jury.
Id. at 56.
Courts recognize that the purpose of the opening statement
is to orient the jury,

so that they have a framework within which

to analyze the evidence.
out this framework,

In the present case the prosecution laid

then went further and told the jury of

evidence he thought the defense would present.

The prosecution was,

in effect, anticipating the defense and attempting to defuse it at
the start.

This was clearly an improper argument which prejudiced

the appellant by attacking the integrity of the defense counsel.
The magnitude of the mischief occasioned

by the prosecutor's

character assassination of defense counsel is not easily palpable.
However, the tip of the iceberg is at least recognizable when one
considers that the purpose and effect of the prosecutor's broadside
was to cast the defense counsel as an unscrupulous rogue wholly
underserving of belief.

Thus, as a result of the prosecutor's

opening statement, before a shread of admissible evidence was
before the jury, the appellant found himself beginning his trial
with a lawyer which the prosecutor had painted as the picture of
perfidy.

POINT II
DPFJ::NSV COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO
WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE.
(A) The court erred in denying defense counsel's motion
to withdraw as counsel when he notified the court
that it would be necessary for him to testify on
behalf of the defendant.

-7-
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The

America~

Bar Association (A.B.A.) Code of Professic

Ethics provides:
DR 5-102
(A)

Withdrawal as counsel when the lawyer
becomes a witness.
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
learns or it is obvious tnat he or a
lawyer in his firm ought to be called as
a witness on behalf of his client. he
shall withdraw from the conduct of the
trial and his firm, if any, shall not
continue representation in the trial.

This rule is subject to certain exceptions not applicable in the
present case.
The A.B. A. committee set out the reasoning behind the
rules under Canon 5 in the ethical considerations. In EC 5-9
they state:
Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in
a particular case whether he will be a witness or
an advocate.
If a lawyer is both counsel and
witness, he becomes more easily impeachable for
interest and thus may be a less effective witness.
Conversely, the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of the
lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an
advocate in the case.
An advocate who becomes a
witness is in the unseemly and ineffective
position of arguing his own credibility.
The
roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to
advance or argue the cause of another, while
that of a witness is to state facts objectively.
Ethical Consideration 5-10 provides in part:
. where the question [of a lawyer becoming
a witness] arises, doubts should be resolved
in favor of the lawyer testifying and against
his becoming or continuing as an advocate.
In the present case the prosecutor, in his opening stac
stated
that his principal witness, Weaver, was coerced by the dei
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1~t~

signing a statement inconsistent with what his trial testimony

'.could be.

He intimated that defense counsel had somehow played a

role in obtaining this statement.

(T.7)

During the direct exam-

ination of Weaver the prosecutor's questions implied that defense
counsel had approached Weaver and coerced him into signing a
statement favorable to the appellant.

(T.34)

At this point defense

counsel made a motion for a mistrial and a motion to withdraw from
1
the case.
Defense counsel felt it would he in the best interests
of his client for him to testify in order to rebut the prosecutor's
insinuations.

Counsel proposed to testify about the circumstances

1
Defense counsel endeavored to explain his motion in light of
the aforementioned Disciplinary Rule and Ethical Considerations, but was
met with some resistence from the court.
Some time later, the court
evidently realized the relevance of the rule, and then referred to it.
MR. BUGDEN:

EC 5-10 states--

THE COURT:

Mr. Bugden, we are not going to read all the
canons of ethics here today.

MR. BUGDE~:

Well, the next canon i i directly in point.
It specifically says if there is any
questions as to whether or not the lawyer
should act as a lawyer or be a witness,
all of those questions have to be resolved
in allowing the lawyer to be a witness.
In this case I have to be a witness to rebut
the insinuation of the prosecutor and Mr.
Christensen has to be a witness to rebut that.

THE COURT:

Mr. Bugden, just refer to the canon and don't
take time to read it. (T.124)

THE COURT:

And are you going to call yourself as a witness?

MR. BUGDEN:

I haven't made that decision.

THE COURT:

Then it is my understanding as I remember somein the ethics that states if counsel takes
the stand as a witness in the case he cannot
proceed and argue the case.
(T.134)

;'('

*

*
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surrounding the receipt of Weaver's statements.2 Defense counsel
also moved to call the prosecutor as a witness in order to show
that he had been aware of the fact that Weaver had approached
defense counsel wishing to help with the defense. 3

These motions

were denied by the court.
2MR. BUGDEN: At this time, Your Honor, I would also m~
a motion to withdraw from the case.
I feel that after
the remarks that Mr. Christensen had made in the recc
for his honor, my state of mind is such that I truly'
upset and I am now presented with cross-examining a
witness who I am accused of [intimidating].
I am also
accused of coercing his testimony or tampering with bi
testimony.
Of course, Mr. Christensen has made the sa
insinuation to this Court.
Obviously, this is the mos
important witness for the case.
The defense will not
able to cross-examine this witness effectively.
I
would certainly be less than candid if I did not state
for the record that I do not feel that I am in a posit
now that I can go forward and vigorously cross-examin
this witness.
I truly am upset.
I am shocked that Mr
Christensen would make the accusation that he had abou
I don't believe that I can ade~uately and competently
completely defend Mr. Williams interests at this time
(T. 44).
3Mr. Christensen was aware that Weaver solicited the
defense attorney first, not the defense attorney solic
Weaver first.
Yet he in opening statement insinuated
the jury that I engaged in improper conduct by sending
my investigators out to the prison to obtain a stateme
And that is false.
And the only way that can be rebut
is if Mr. Christensen himself testifies in this case, a
he must testify in this case.
(T. 123).

-10-
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Defense counsel should have been allowed to withdraw from
the case and testify on behalf of the defendant.

The general rule

is that an attorney is competent to testify on behalf of his client.
Am.

Jur. Witnesses §152. In State v. Blake, 157 Conn. 99, 249 A.2d

232 (1963), the defense counsel asked to withdraw so that he could
testify as to a conversation he had with a prosecution witness
prior to trial.

~he

Connecticut Supreme Court said:

[T]he Canons of Professional Ethics [do] not
disqualify or render incompetent as a witness,
an attorney who has participated in a trial;
it is error to refuse to permit him to offer
himself as a witness. [Citations Omitted].
Id. at 234.
Similarly, where defense counsel in the present case asked to
withdraw so that he could testify as to the circumstances surrounding
obtaining Weaver's statement, such motion should not have been refused.
In People v. Kuczynski,

23 Ill.

2d 320, 178 N.E. 2d 294

(1961), the court reversed the defendant's conviction of armed
robbery where the trial court had refused to allow defense counsel to
withdraw and testify.

At defendant's preliminary hearing a prose-

cution witness had been unable to identify the defendant, however
at trial the witness testified that he had identified the defendant
at the preliminary hearing.

The Illinois court stated:

As it is apparent that Schewe's testimony surprised
defendant, the trial judge should have allowed
defendant's attorney to testify.
" Id. at 295.
Although the TJtah Supreme Court has never spoken directly
to this issue. they have accepted the theory underlying Canon 5 of
the A. R. A. Code of Professional

~thics.

In Galarowicz v. Ward,

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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230 P.2d 576 (Utah 1951), defense counsel called as a witness hi!
co-counsel.

Although co-counsel had participated in the trial,

his role had been limited.

Plaintiff's counsel objected to

defense counsel being allowed to testify without withdrawing and
the court overruled this objection.

The court noted that the

purpose of the rule:
.is to avoid putting a lawyer in the obviously
embarrassing predicament of testifying and then
having to argue the credibility and effect of his
own testimony.
Id. at 580.
The court went on tu note that the plaintiff's counsel was attempt
to use the rule to disqualify competent counsel from continuing :
the trial,

and that the rule could not be used for such a purpos
In the present case it was error to deny defense counsE

motion to withdraw so that he could testify on behalf of his clie
Defense counsel was surprised by the accusations of the prosecute
and the testimony of Weaver and believed it essential to testify
to rebut the prosecutor's innuendoes.

In order to testify as a

witness defense counsel desired to withdraw so that he would not
have to argue his credibility and testimony to the jury.
erred in overruling defense
(B)

counsel~

The cou

motion to withdraw.

Defense counsel should have been allowed to
withdraw where his credibility had been
attacked by the prosecutor.

The trial judge refused defense counsel's motion to
withdraw in the face of an attack on his integrity and credibilit
by the prosecutor.

The Supreme Court, in Berger v. United States

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The United States Attorney is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore.
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just one.
In the present case the prosecutor struck foul blows.

He

implied that defense counsel had been instrumental in obtaining
perjurious statements from a prosecution witness in order to aid
his client.

This assertion was calculated to influence the jury

improperly.

Accordingly, the trial court erred by not permitting

defense counsel to withdraw.
Although the Utah Court has never dealt with the issue
of a prosecutor's misconduct in attacking defense counsel, several
other courts have addressed it.

In Watkins v. State, 140 Tenn. 1,

203 S.W. 344 (1917), the Tennessee Supreme Court established the
standard of conduct for a district attorney general:
Imputation of dishonesty to adversary counsel
in remarks addressed to them by the district
attorney touching their conduct of the defense
was an impropriety so gross that it must now
appear to be such to the offical who gave the
words utterance . . . It was error not to sustain
objection when interposed.
Id. at 346.
rhis standard was reiterated and followed in Dupree v. State, 410
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S. W.

2d 890 (Tenn. 1967).

When the facts of the present case are

analyzed in light of this standard,

it is clear that the prosecut

attack on the integrity and credibility of defense counsel was
improper.
The Tenth Circuit Court recently examined the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct in United States v. Jones,
(10th Cir. 1978).

578 F.2d 1332

The court first noted that in general it is "

improper for the district attorney to imply that defense counsel
has been involved in subornation of perjury.
omitted] Id. at 1338.

'' [Citations

The court went on to hold, however, that

where defense counsel had introduced and emphasized testimony
that implicated him in an attempt to obtain a perjurious statemer
the jury verdict would not be reversed.
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d
1151 (2d Cir. 1976) ,found that the prosecutor, in a trial for
conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank, had implied improper
purpose to defense counsel's questioning.

The court noted that

. successful - even zealous - prosecution does not require
improper suggestions, insinuating and, especially, assertions of
personal knowledge."

Id. at 1155.

The court reversed the case.

In Weathers v. United States, 117 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1941) the
defendant was convicted of sending abortion information through
the mails.

The prosecutor argued that: "It was plain to be seen

that the defendant, or defendant's counsel or somebody, had gotte
[sic] to this woman between the time she delivered that paper to
and the time she was called to testify."

Id. at 586.
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The court

e

that the argument "

.was calculated to, and did, prejudice

the rights of the defendant before the jury.

lt was the duty of

the trial court to have promptly excluded this improper argument
and directed the jury not to consider it.
committed perjudicial error."

Failing in this the court

[Citations omitted]. Id. at 586.

In Carter v. State, Fla. App., 356 So. 2d.67, 1978,
the rourt reversed the

defendant~

of prosecutorial misconduct.

conviction of robbery because

During closing arguments the prose-

cutor attacked the defense attorney saying "she's trying to mislead
you.

That's her job.

She's been appointed to be the defendant's

mouthpiece, and she's done it."

Upon objection the prosecutor

explained "I'm not accusing her of anything,
I'm not saying that she is."

Id. at 67.

I said,

'almost',

Based upon this argument

the court reversed the defendant's conviction.
Similarly, in the present case the prosecutor attacked
the integrity of the defense with wholly inadmissible evidence.
The following colloquy demonstrates the character of the prosecutor's
tactics:
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN

Q:

When you saw this typewritten
statement that was there to
discredit and get Joey off the
charges, did you ever receive
a copy of that statement?

BY MR. WEAVER

A:

For a couple of hours.

Q:

Hho gave you that copy initially?

A:

An investigator for the public
defender's office.

Q:

What happened to that copy?

A:

They repossessed it.

-15-
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Q:

Did they tell you why?

A:

No.

Q:

Did they give you any indicat~
of why they were doing it?

A:

I assume it was incriminating.
(T.39)

The most logical conclusion for a juror to draw from
this conversation is that defense counsel somehow tried to coercE
the witness into signing a false statement to exculpate the
appellant.
As in Weathers, supra, the prosecutor's questioning wa1
calculated to "prejudice the rights of the defendant before the
jury."

The questioning is aimed at directing the jury's thought:

to the impropriety of defense

counsel's actions, not the guilt

or innocence of the defendant.

The implication is that defense

counsel had no case and thus must force a witness to perjure
himself in order to manufacture a defense.

Such trial tactics

are shockingly improper.
Defense counsel's testimony would have shown that Weav:
voluntarily approached defense counsel desiring to aid in the
defense of the appellant.

Weaver first approached defense couns1

the prosecutor was immediately notified of the conversation.

Wh1

defense counsel later approached Weaver to obtain a statement of
the events he did so because of the insistence of Weaver on the
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c

earlier occasion.~

The jury could not fairly evaluate the case without
'.zno,,-1ledge of the relationships between defense counsel, Weaver and
the prosecutor.

The testimony of Weaver should have been put in

proper perspective; and the only persons who could do this were
the defense counsel and the prosecutor.

Thus,

in view of the

prosecutor's clearly improper argument, defense counsel should
have been allowed to withdraw and testify as to the circumstances
surrounding the statement in question.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENSE
COUNSEL TO CALL THE PROSECUTOR AS A MATERIAL
WITNESS.
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 7 provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in these Rules or
the Strttutes of this state, (a) every person is

5MR. BUGDEN:

I would submit to the court, proffer to the
Court at this time; that prior to the time that
~ike Weaver was incarcerated at the prison, prior
to the time his parole was revoked, Mr. Weaver
cal led me at mv office.
. Mr. Weaver did in
fact, make contact with me by telephone and told
me in telephone conversation that he wanted to
cooperate with the defense in this case, that he
did not want to testify against Mr. Williams in
this case, and testify on behalf of the State, and
indicated to me that he was willing to make a
statement that would be favorable to the defense
in this case.
I then immediately called Mr. Christensen and related to him that this man, his witness, Mr. Weaver
had called me at my office.
I then told Mr. Christensen that in fact, I was of
the opinion that Mike Weaver was trying to set me
up.
(T. 121-123).
-17-
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qualified to [sic] a witness, and (b) no person
has a privilege to refuse to be a witness, and
(c) no person is disqualified to testify to
any matter.
"
Thus there isno statutory bar to defense counsel calling the pro
cutor as a witness.
The general rule is that a prosecutor is a competent
witness.

149 A.L.R.1305.

The Utah Supreme Court recognized thi

rule in State v. Greene, 38 Utah 389, 115 P.181 (1910).

Courts

recognize, however, the problems inherent in calling the prosecu:
as a witness for the defense.

Thus, the South Carolina Supreme

Court, in State v. Lee, 28 S.E.2d 402 (1943),refused to allow
defense counsel to call the prosecutor where his evidence was me:
cumulative.

The Court also found that the trial court had dis·

cretion to limit the number of defense witnesses called to estab
a single point.

The court noted, however:

There is no statutory prohibition which prevents
the calling of a prosecuting attorney by the
defense as a witness, and generally speaking he
is a competent witness to testify as to all
relevant facts coming to his knowledge, except
privile~ed communications.
It is not believed that
the rignt to call the prosecuting attorney as a
witness for the defense would result in an
inveterate practice.
Else, it is readily seen
that it might result in embarrassment in the
due administration of justice. However, the
constitutional guarantees of the defendant's
(Const. 1895, Art. 1, Sec. 18) outweigh the
evil which may be anticipated.
Id. at 405.
In the case at bar the prosecutor implied that defense
had approached the prosecution's major witness and coerced him i:
-18-
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signing a statement favorable to appellant.

The prosecutor explained

the circumstances under which Weaver was approached.

"Mr. Weaver

was incarcerated at the State Prison, he was in a rather precarious
situation since he is now a state witness.
threats made to him from prison inmates.

He has had several
. he [signed the

statement] under duress and coercion at thetime because of the
circumstance he was in." (T.7)
Although the circumstances as described by Mr. Christensen
u:

were true, he failed to accurately describe the mole picture.
Although Weaver was in prison at the time the statement was taken,
he had approached defense counsel with an offer to help while he was

e:

b.

:

free on bail and under no coercion.

(T. 121-123)

This added

explanation changes considerably the import of Mr. Christensen's
argument.

It was, therefore, necessary for defense counsel to call

Mr. Christensen as a witness so that he could elicit the missing
circumstances surrounding the signing of the statement.
In Chatman v. State, 334 N.E. 2d 673 (Ind. 1975), the
Indiana Supreme Court noted that counsel should be subject to call as
a witness when he ".

is believed to have material information

that cannot be otherwise disclosed."

Id. at 682. In the present case

the prosecutor alone could testify that defense counsel had contacted
him concerning Weaver's desire to assist in the defense of Joey
Hilliams.

Moreover, by refusing to allow the appellant to call Mr.

Christensen to the stand, the court denied the appellant his right
to confrontation as protected by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.
3(il'~Lt:ional

Because the state was the beneficiary of this con-

error, the State must bear the burden of proving beyond a
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reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.
386 U.S.

Chapman v. Califo:

18 (1967).
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE P~OSECVTOR
TO CROSS-EXAMDTE A DEFE?'TSE WITNESS ABOUT THE
DETAILS OF HIS PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION.
Utah Code Annotated §78-24-9 (1953 as amended) provide,
A witness must answer questions legal and pertinent
to the matter in issue,
although his answer may
establish a claim against himself; but he need not
give an answer which will have a tendency to subject
him to punishment for a felony, nor need he give an
answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade
his character, unless it is to the very fact in
issue would be presumed.
But a witness must answer
as to the fact of his previous conviction of a felony.
In the present case the defendant called as a witness :

Miller.

Miller was an acquaintance of the appellant and Weaver:

prison.

Defense counsel asked Miller if he had been convicted

of a felony,

the nature of that felony conviction, and when the

viction was handed down.

c

Defense counsel then proceeded to elic'.

testimony as to Weaver's reputation at the prison for being a "sr
and his need to fear the other inmates.

On cross-examination thE

prosecutor, over objection, asked Miller the specifics of his cm
viction.

He asked what he robbed and who he kidnapped and why h<

had kidnapped someone.
Q:
A:

Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:

This was clearly an outra;

(BY MR. CHRISTENSEN) What did you rob?
(BY MR. BUGDE~) He is not entitled to ask that qt

THE COURT:
A:

(T. 222-223).

*

*

*

*

*

The Court would overrule the objection.

(BY MR. MILLER)
I beat up two guys and took thei:
licenses and one of their wallets.
Who did you kidnap?
Back in '79.
Who did you kidnap?
This kid that I know.
You kidnapped a kid that you know?
Yes.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

line of questioning and should never have been condoned.
The credibility of the witness had already been put at issue
by his admission of a prior felony conviction.

The only possible

reason for the prosecutor's attack on this witness was to smear his
character and to degrade him.
Utah Rules of

~vidence

This is the very mischief which the

are designed to preclude.

If such questioning

was permitted many witnesses would balk at testifying knowing that
any embarrassing incidents in their past might be dredged up and
paraded before the jury.

The effect of the prosecutor's degrading

cross-examination was to portray the defendant's witnesses as
"bad guys", a patently improper practice.
This court announced its rule limiting the questions that
could be asked about a prior felony conviction in State v. Johnson
287 P. 909 (Utah 1930), citing 1 Wharton,

Criminal Evidence,

(10th

Sd) p. 404. The court stated the general rule:
A witness,

Jf.

as affecting his credibility, may be
asked if he had not previously been convicted of
a felony, and the kind or name of the felony, but
not as to the details or circumstances of it.

Q:

qt

:

A:
Q:
A:

Q:

Bow old was the kid?
Eleven.
Did you hold him for ransom?
No.

1-Jhy did you kidnap him?
A
That is beside the point.
[Objection by Mr. Bugden]
The Court:
The court is going to hold that the witness has
been called and counsel has the right to attack the
credibility of the witness and to go into the matters and
I will overrule the objection. (T. 223)
-21-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This general rule has been scrupulously followed by
the Utah Courts.

In State v. Kazda,

14 Utah 2d 266, 332 P 2d 41

(1963), the Supreme Court detailed the reasoning for such a rule
The apparent purpose and reason for permitting the
prosecution to question the accused regarding prior
felony convictions is to affect his credibility as a
witness. [Citations omitted].
However, the details
or circumstances surrounding the felony or felonies
for which the accused was convicted may not be
inquired into except under unusual circumstances
In the present case the witness was called for the lirr
purpose of showing Weaver's reputation at the prison.

Over the

objections of defense counsel, the prosecutor proceeded to degra
the witness by eliciting from him the specifics of the prior
conviction.

The court, however, overruled defense counsel's

objection on the grounds that the prosecutor had the right to
attack the credibility of the witness.

(T. 223)

The prosecutors questions clearly went beyond acceptab
bounds.

He was bent on vilifying the witness regardless of the

limitations imposed by the Rules of Evidence.

The prosecutor is

at liberty to smear the character of the defense witnesses in or
to strengthen his case.

The court committed prejudicial error c

permitting the prosecutor to sidestep the Kazda rule and debase
witness with unabashed zeal.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING DEFENST<: COUNSEL'S
OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT WHEREIN HE REFERRED TO INJURIES TO THE
VICTIM WHICH WERE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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During the course of his closing argument the prosecutor
stated:
Bear in mind also up to what the impact would have
been had Mr. Cassins Clark himself been injured or
other "bitches" for victims. (T. Book 2 page 4)
Defense counsel immediately objected to this line of argument, however
his objection was overruled.

There was no evidence introduced at trial

that Mr. Cassins Clark had been injured.

The appellant claims that

such an argument prejudiced him and entitled him to a new trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has never addressed the present
issue, however other courts have.

The Idaho Supreme Court, in State

v. Spencer, 258 P.2d 1147 (Idaho 1953), held that an improper
closing argument by a prosecutor was reversible error.
the defendant was convicted of second degree murder.

In that case
During his

closing argument the associate prosecutor referred to the grisly
details of another murder.

The prosecutor also made comments meant

to "impress the jury to determine the case on factors outside the
evidence."

Id. at 1153.

In reversing the defendant's conviction,

the Idaho court held:
Where the record shows that the prosecuting attorney
has been guilty of misconduct calculated to inflame
the minds of the jurors and arouse prejudice or passion
against the accused by statements in his argument of
facts not proved by evidence, the conviction will be
set aside and a new trial granted. [Citations omitted).
Statements of fact not in evidence by the prosecuting attorney in his
argument to the jury may constitute prejudicial misconduct.
[Citations omitted).

Id. at 1154.

In the case at bar the prosecutor's reference to what might
hC'1e happened had Mr. Clark been injured was clearly meant to
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"inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse prejudice or passior
against the accused."

Such an argument was totally improper. A

defendant should not be convicted based upon the conjecture of
what might have happened to the victim.
The California Supreme Court has held that statements
facts that are not in evidence constitute

misconduct.

In Peopl

v. Kirkes, 249 P.2d 1 (Calif. 1952) the defendant was convicted
of a murder that had occurred eight years before the trial.

The

state's chief witness was a woman who said she had seen the vict
get into the defendant's car the night of the murder.

This witn

however, did not tell her story until the defendant had been ind
eight years after the murder.
"[T]he de-puty district attorney excused [the witness']
long silence by her asserted fear for her own safety
if she testified against Kirkes.
There is no evidence
whatever upon which to base that statement.
To pictur
Kirkes as a murderer who would kill again to cover
his crime and so bold that he had threatened those who
might testify against him was entirely unjustified."
Id. at 4-5.
Based upon this improper argument the court reversed
defendant's conviction.
Similarly, in the present case, by asking the jury to
consider 'what if Mr.

Clark had been injured," the prosecutor was

portraying the appellant as a

ruthless person who would have

maimed or injured at the slightest provocation.
was highly prejudicial to the appellant.

Such an argumen

There was no evidence

indicate that the appellant was in fact a ruthless criminal, the:
the prosecutor's argument, wholly unsupported by the evidence,
constituted misconduct.

Because of the highly prejudicial natur
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Jr.

argument the appellant's conviction should be reversed.
In State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.

2d 748 (Iowa 1973), the

Iowa Supreme Court reversed the defendants conviction for drunk
driving because of the prosecutors improper closing argument.

The

court noted:
"Additionally, the prosecutor undertook to inflame
the fears,passions and prejudice of the jury as
against the defendant.
This was done by inferentially
urging the jurors to place themselves and members of
their f arnilies in a hypothetical position of peril
created by a drunken, [sic] car operating defendant."
Id. at 751.

he
:t
tn'

The court found that such an argument prejudiced the defendant and

nd based upon this and other improprieties the conviction was reversed.

The logic of the Vickroy case is just as compelling in the case at
bar.

POINT VI
THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL AND
DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE PROSECUTOR
KNOWINGLY FOSTERED THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT
WEAVER WOULD STILL SERVE TWO YEARS IN PRISON
EVEN THOUGH HE TESTIFIED FOR TRE STATE.

ho

0

en

he:

ur

During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Weaver
had a motive to lie because in exchange for this favorbale testimony
the county attorney was willing to strike a generous plea bargain and
dismiss two pending felony charges which both carried possible prison
sentences.

To rebut this argument the prosecutor asserted:
Mr. Bugden seemed to highlight the fact that Mr.
Weaver also has an incentive to lie here today,
because he may [not] have to do the time, Mr,
Weaver is doing the time.
He's got two more years
to do on his time.
(T. 20)
-25-
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Do rou think another Class A conviction would
rea ly affect him that much out there at the
State prison? Another year in jail at the
prison? He is out there two years already.
It is much more to his advantage to lie to you
and say that Joey Williams wasn't involved. (T.23)
Thus, the prosecutor asserted not only that Weaver had no reason
to the jury, but that in spite of his cooperation with the State
Weaver would serve two more years at the prison.
Contrary to the prosecutor's assurances, Weaver did not
spend the next two years in prison.

In fact, Weaver was out of

prison within one month after he had helped the appellant.

One c

the major factors behind Weaver's early parole was the prosecutor
plea to the Board of Pardons.

It appears that the prosecutor ah

dismissed totally the charges that were pending against Weaver at
the time of his participation in the appellant's trial.
before the Board

In testi

of Pardons the prosecutor stated:

"My way of assessing that, [Weaver's potential
to society if he is released at some reasonable
date in the future] of course, the trial a~ainst
Joey Williams, which was an aggravated robbery charge.
He could have backed out at anytime, and didn't.
And as a result of the conviction that we got
against Mr. Williams and at that point of time,
I assessed with myself the type of character
that I felt Mr. Weaver would be.
And at that time,
I -- on my own motion -- moved the court to dismiss
the other charges against him.
I didn't have to do that.
The plea bargain was set.
I could have insisted that he plead to another felony
charge. Which I do not do.
And it was based upon my
assessment of him.
Although I've only been a prosecutor for four years, I believe that my assessment is
somewhat valid.
And I feel Mr. Weaver is an asset.
And Mr. Weaver recognizes his shortcomings and his
shortfalls. He recognizes that his main problem has
been the people he associates with.
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I think that's going to change for him in the
future.
And Mike knows I'll go to bat for him
one time.
And he's the first person I've gone
to bat for, because of the observations I've
made in the court proceeding, and the struggle
I watched him with.
(Board of Pardons
Transcript, 5- 7)
Appellant contends that the inconsistent arguments of the
prosecutor before the jury and before the Board of Pardons denied him
both a fair trial and due process of law.

During closing arguments

the prosecutor asserted, more than once, that Weaver's testimony was
believable because by so testifying he would be in danger during the
next two years while inprison.

However, one month later the prose-

cutor told the Board of Pardons that because of Weaver's conduct
during the trial, he, the prosecutor, had decided to ask the court
to dismiss all pending charges and to ask the Board of Pardons to release
Weaver immediately.

At the time of the closing argument the prose-

cutor either knew for certain, or strongly suspected, that he would do
everything he could to get Weaver out of prison.

Thus, his argument

to the jury was grossly improper and constituted misconduct.
The Utah Supreme Court recently considered a similar situation.
InWalkerv.

St~te,

Case

~o.

16705, filed January 23, 1981, this

court reversed the defendant'sconviction where the prosecutor exploited
what he knew as a false impression in the minds of the jurors.

In

that case the defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of heroin
with the intent to distribute for value.

During a search of the

living quarters above defendant's restaurant the police discovered

-27-
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heroin.

They also arrested a man who was sleeping above the

restaurant at the time of the raid.

Walker's defense at

trial~

that she did not have exclusive use and control of the room where
the heroin was found.

She argued that the man had been using the

room and that the heroin must have been his.
The prosecutor presented evidence that rhe room in que'
was locked at the time of the raid and that no
found in the room.

~en's

clothing was

During the trial the prosecutor learned that

man had been sleeping in the room and that his clothing was locat
in that room.·

The prosecutor. however.

in closing arguments. sta

that there was not evidence to support the defendant's contentio:
that she did not have exclusive control over the room.
In reversing the defendant's conviction this court stat
"Whether or not the prosecution was aware of the fact
this testimony was incorrect at the time it was given.
he was later made expressly aware of that fact during
the course of the trial.
Yet, the prosecuting attorne:
failed to disclose the contradicting testimony to the .
plaintiff or the court. and instead deliberately relie:
on the false impression created by the original testirnc
in both his closing argument and summation to the jur;·
We have previously stated that the State while charged
with vigorously enforcing the laws "has a duty to not
only secure appropriate convictions. but an even
higher duty to see that justice is done. [Citation
omitted].
In his role as the state's representative~
criminal matters, the prosecutor. therefore, must not
only attempt to win cases. but must see that justice i:
done. [Citation Omitted]
Thus, while he should
prosecute with earnestness and vigor. it is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one
[Citation omitted].
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Applying this standard to the present case, we
believe their exists a reasonable likelihood
the false imoression fostered by the prosecutor
could have affected the judgment of the jury.
Id. at 4-6.
Similarly, in the present case, the prosecutor created
a false impression before the jury.

He argued that Weaver was

believable because he had two more years to serve at the prison,
and because his testimony was against his best interest.

Yet one

:nonth later; this same prosecutor argued for Weaver's immediate

le

parole, an act which totally repudiated his remarks to the jury.
This duplicity is in contravention of the standard laid down in
State v. Adam, 583 P.2d 89 (Utah 1978) and Walker v. State, supra.
As in Walker, there is a "reasonable likelihood the false impression
fostered by the prosecution could have affected the judgment of the
jury."

the appellant's conviction should be reversed.

•

POINT VII
THE APPELLAflT' S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS DENED
BY THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE PROSECUTOR'S
MISCONDUCT.

UC

ir

Thus,

Appellant submits that each of the errors in the preceding
points constitutes prejudicial error that would require a reversal
of the judgment of the court below.

But these errors must also be

considered to have had a cumulative effect on the outcome of the
trial.

The misconduct of the prosecutor was hardly confined to a

single instance.

Rather,

his opening remarks,
argumeni-

the prosecutor's conduct was egregious from

throughout the trial, and during. his closing

From beginning to end Mr. Christensen exhibited conduct

~~acreui-able

for a prosecutor.

The combination of the prosecutor's
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insinuation that defense counsel coerced a false statement from
Weaver;

the court's refusal to allow defense counsel to rebut

t~

innuendo by either testifying himself or calling the prosecutor
to the stand; the unrestricted and unabashed character assassinat
of defense witnesses; the prosecutor's reference in his closing
argument to what might have happened had the victim been injured
(where the evidence disclosed that the victim was uninjured); and
the prosecutor's exploitation of the false impression that Weaver
not get a "free ride" in return for his testimony because he woul·
still be serving two years in prison operated to prejudice the
appellant by denying him a fair and impartial trial.

In Berger \'

United States, supra, the United States Supreme Court held:
We have not here a case where the misconduct
of the prosecuting attorney was slight or confined
to a single instance, but one where such misconduct was pronounced and persistent, with a
probable cumulative effect upon the jury which
cannot be disregarded as inconsequential.
Id.
at 89.
And so it was in the present case.

The misconduct of t

prosecutor was so "pronounced and persistent" that it requires

tr

reversal of defendant's conviction.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the individual and
cumulative errors stated herein require reversal of the jury verd
and the judgment entered thereon.

The appellant therefore asks t
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Court to grant him a new trial in the Third Judicial District Court.
DATED this

_2.i_

day of May, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,

Walter F. Bugden, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

~.AILING

CERTIFICATE

Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT

84114 this

~-day

of May, 1981.
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